Introduction
Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) was a publishing success in its author's lifetime, going through six authorised editions in Britain, and gaining appreciative readers in France and Germany as well. Its fortunes after Smith's death were not, however, sustained. For a long time TMS lay largely forgotten, before being press-ganged into the so-called 'Das Adam Smith Problem' associated with German scholars of the latter 19 th Century.
1 Happily, matters have recently once again been reversed. The 'Das Adam
Smith Problem' has largely been left behind as an interpretative wrong turn, and Smith's moral philosophy is today the focus of healthy interest in its own right.
2
Yet despite this welcome redux a core feature of Smith's moral theory in TMS remains largely unappreciated. This concerns the nature of Smith's engagement with the account of moral foundations put forward by his friend and philosophical forerunner, David Hume. Certainly, the relationship between Smith and Hume on this score has attracted scholarly attention. But with regards to the foundations of morals, this has so far focused upon Smith and Hume's rival accounts of 'sympathy' (Raynor 1984; Darwall 1998, 264-70; 1999, 141-5; Otteson 2002, 30-9; Broadie 2006; Fleischacker 2012; SayreMcCord 2013 ; for a holistic overview, Hanley 2016 ). Yet as I will show, disagreement over sympathy is only the starting point of Smith's engagement with Hume's account of the foundations of morals. My central contention is that the argument of TMS can be understood as in part a rejection of Hume's division of the virtues into 'artificial' and 'natural'. 3 Although both thinkers agreed that morality was fundamentally a purely human construction -the product of imaginative psychological processes combined with the capacity to share the sentiments of others (Griswold 1999, 155-73 ) -Smith's vitiation of Hume's bifurcation was the backbone of an attempt to reject the older philosopher's central system, replacing it with that of TMS. Whilst Smith thought that Hume was working with the right materials in attempting to construct an account of morality based in the passions, and in particular the operations of sympathy, he judged that Hume's way of assembling these materials was not correct. Smith's ambition was not only to offer a moral theory that he thought was correct, but to stake a claim to having offered the most plausible sentimentalist theory then available. In practice, this meant one that was superior to Hume's. Doing so, however, would require moving Hume's theory off of the philosophical territory that it had staked, claiming it for Smith's instead. Thus a major ambition of TMS was to reject and replace Hume's earlier sentimentalist account.
My argument proceeds in four main sections. The first recapitulates Hume's theory of the virtues in the Treatise of Human Nature. The second examines Smith's claim that even the supposed 'natural' virtues have to be understood in terms of fundamental social composition. The third examines Smith's treatment of justice -Hume's paradigm artificial virtue -and presents the younger Scot's treatment as a technical modification within sociability theory, revealing an ineliminable natural foundation. The fourth considers the place of Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and his emphasis 3 Istvan Hont suggests that 'Smith applied the explanatory mechanism offered by Hume's theory of the origin of justice to the rise of moral rules in society in general', the implication being that Smith rendered all of the virtues artificial (Hont 2015, 35 ). As we shall see, this is not quite right: Smith is better read as fundamentally problematizing any artificial/natural distinction, and thereby moving beyond Hume's terms of analysis. Similarly, James Otteson suggests that Hume imperfectly anticipated Smith's emphasis on the emergence of spontaneous order in moral affairs (Otteson 2002, 120-1) . But this does not, I aim to show, adequately capture the extent of Smith's ambition and corrective. Furthermore, as Ryan Patrick Hanley has pointed out to me, Smith seems to take over wholesale Hume's distinction between the awful and amiable virtues, which renders their relationship even more complex. This paper, however, will focus only on their disagreements about moral foundations, leaving discussion of the typology of virtues for another time.
there on the centrality of utility to moral appraisal, presenting Part IV of TMS as a critical response to Hume in the context of the corrective that Smith had already laid down in Parts I-III. I conclude by indicating the wider significance of these readings.
Hume: Natural and Artificial Virtues
Hume famously dismissed the possibility that moral distinctions are founded in any operation of reason, insisting instead that they arise from our 'impressions' rather than 'ideas', meaning that 'Morality…is more properly felt than judg'd of' (Hume 2007 'particular manner', we pronounce the action to be good or bad, the motive or character virtuous or vicious.
Hume divides the virtues in turn into 'natural' and 'artificial'. The 'natural', despite coming later in the Treatise presentation, are the easiest to account for. They are those that, upon observing, we receive a sense of pleasure, and thus immediately feel a corresponding approbation towards the relevant agent(s) regarding. Due to our capacity to sympathise we can easily attribute virtue (or vice) to others, even when their actions in no way affect us personally. A paradigm case might be benevolence: observing Agent A do a good deed to Agent B, and inferring that A's motivation was simply to aid B, this gives rise to a feeling of pleasure via sympathy with both the motive of the agent and the benefit of the recipient, and thus we denominate such behaviour virtuous. In other words: natural virtues are those that upon simple observation give rise to the sentiments of pleasure peculiarly associated with moral approbation (Hume 2007; T.3.3.1.1-12; SBN 574-80 (Darwall 1998, 264-70; Otteson 2002, 30-9; Fleischacker 2012) . The main points of contrast may be summarised as follows. Smith's conception of sympathy is more wide-ranging than Hume's, denoting 'our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever' (Smith 1976, I.i.I.5 (Darwall 1998; 1999) .
Smith builds his moral theory on what he takes to be a crucial upshot of our capacity to imaginatively trade places with others. He tells us that 'nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary' (Smith 1976, I .i.2.I). When we enter imaginatively into the situation of others, if we find a correspondence between the way that we imagine we would feel were we them, and the way we believe that they actually feel, then this correspondence automatically pleases. By contrast if we find that there is a lack of congruence between how we imagine we would feel, and how we think that they do feel, then we are pained (as in both cases is the other party). Smith claims that this specific form of pleasure or pain via mutual or absent sympathy is the basis of moral approbation or disapprobation (I.i.2.1-6; I.iii.I.9).
It is worth noting that in offering this explication Smith was providing a more thorough account of the 'particular manner' by which pleasure grounds moral taste than
Hume had provided. Yet Hume famously disagreed with Smith's account of sympathy, claiming that despite being the 'hinge' of the younger man's system, it was false insofar as it could not make sense of the phenomenon of painful sympathy (Hume 1932a, 313) . I shall touch on this matter in the conclusion, but for now I put aside Hume's complaint about the technical workings of Smith's sympathy theory and suggest that Smith's 'hinge'
opened the door to a thoroughgoing rejection of Hume's account, extending beyond a rival account of fellow-feeling alone.
We can begin to see this by first briefly reviewing Smith's own moral theory.
Smith divides moral judgement into two general parts:
[T]he sentiment or affection of the heart, from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue or vice depends, may be considered under two different aspects, or in two different relations: first, in relation to the cause or object which excites it; and secondly, in relation to the end which it proposes, or to the effect which it tends to produce. (II.i.Introduction.2; cf. I.i.3.5-7)
The first class of virtues falls under the heading of 'propriety', the second under 'merit and demerit'. Smith dedicates Parts I and II of TMS to the analysis of each respectively, claiming that judgements of the personal comportment and moral desert of others track processes of imaginative situation-switching, and the presence or absence of mutual sympathy that arises thereby. Part III aims to show how we come in turn to judge our own conduct, by adopting the perspective of an 'impartial spectator': that in Smith's memorable phrase, 'I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined and judged of' (III.I.6). In all cases, essential to Smith's analysis is the process by which we imaginatively enter into the situation of others (or ourselves considered as another) and examine the extent to which a correspondence of feelings arises, with moral approbation or disapprobation the result of mutual or discordant sympathy.
We can now begin to appreciate the subtle but significant differences that Smith proposes as compared to Hume's theory. In the first instance, on Smith's account the We can see this by turning to TMS Part III, considering Smith's claim that:
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.
All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regards to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view.
Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror he wanted before
This passage is best read as Smith's applying to all of the virtues the thought experiment We become anxious to know how far we deserve their censure or applause, and whether to them we must necessarily appear those agreeable or disagreeable creatures which they represent us. We begin, upon this account, to examine our own passions and conduct, and to consider how these must appear to them, by considering how they would appear to us if in that situation. We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and
endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct. (III.1.5)
It is only by experience of living in society that we can become sensitive to the sentiments of others, and learn to engage successfully in the complex social codes that have already accreted on that foundation, after the passing of many generations, and long before we as individuals learn to live morally in the here and now. Nonetheless, hypothesizing a solitary individual in the state of nature revealed that morality could only be understood as fundamentally social in composition. It thus made no sense to talk of 'natural' virtues. In a state of nature, virtues could no more be 'natural' than 'artificial'.
It might be tempting to conclude that Smith therefore rendered all of the virtues artificial, especially given that he took over Hume's state of nature procedure but applied it more widely. This, however, is best resisted. First, Smith never describes the virtues as artificial (or, for that matter, natural), which is significant given that he knew Hume's earlier account, and thus had such a distinction readily available to him. Second, although
Smith insists that virtue concepts are irreducibly rooted in experience of social phenomena, this process is not best described as 'artificial' because (and taking the Humean spirit to its logical conclusion) it is, Smith thinks, natural for humans to engage in the interactive social processes that gave rise to morality. or Mandeville (deception by legislators redirecting pride into socially-beneficial pursuits through the invention of counterfeit morality and codes of honour). It was the artificial virtue of justice that rendered humans fit for large and lasting society.
Smith agreed with Hume that it was utility, not pride, that needed to be artificially regulated in order to establish large and lasting society, and that this could be accounted for only by the conventions of justice (Hont 1994 (Hont , 2005b The second foundation Smith identified grew out of his observation that a sense of demerit was originally and always conjoined with a desire for the punishment of wrongdoers (merit, conversely, was annexed to the idea of reward) (II.i.1.1-7). This was a basic psychological fact about socialised human beings, but it had special import with regards to justice. 'Nature has implanted in the human breast that consciousness of illdesert, those terrors of merited punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great safe-guard of the association of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent, and to chastise the guilty' (II.ii.3.4). Acts of self-preferment that issued in acquisitive aggression, and hence violated the rules of proper conduct, were automatically viewed by spectators as instances of demerit. Those spectators desired, and would typically seek, the punishment of perpetrators. This punishment (spontaneous and collectively-sanctioned in more primitive conditions) would itself be an effective check against such behaviour.
But furthermore, the psychological experience of judging and being judged would mean that most individuals would internalize a desire not to engage in illicit acquisition because of their own experience of negatively judging others who did so, desiring their punishment, and concluding that they would likewise deserve punishment if engaging in such behaviour, which they spontaneously sought to avoid.
Hence there was a two-fold, mutually reinforcing, foundation to the virtue of justice, which existed in men's hearts after they were living in groups and morally socialised, but prior to the establishment of external conventions of self-interest for regulating property. In failing to appreciate this Hume confused the 'efficient' with the 'final' cause when explaining the origins of that virtue (II.ii.3.5). He mistakenly inferred that because justice was the most fundamental prerequisite of, and facilitator for, the collective pursuit of utility, so a direct regard for utility must be the main causal explanation for the phenomenon of justice. As we saw above, Hume tried to make this claim more plausible by suggesting that individuals sympathized with public utility when approving of the relevant conventions. Smith likened this explanation to believing that because a watch tells the time, all the individual parts that enable it to do so conspire consciously in this end -which of course they do not (II.ii.3.5). Justice was certainly the pillar that upheld the mutual pursuit of utility, and thus of large and lasting society, but the individual 'parts' that made this possible did not have this end in view. 'All men, even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society, how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be' (II.ii.3.9).
Smith capped his critique with a series of further examples to prove that a direct regard for utility was not the proper explanation, even if the promotion of utility was the ultimate function of the rules of justice. These included the regard we have for individuals quite independent of their relationship to a wider multitude; the relative unusualness of punishing solely for the regard to aggregated consequences (such as executing the sleeping sentinel pour encourager les autres); the outrage we feel at a murderer or thief who goes unpunished yet does not again go on to harm society; and the universal human religious belief that there must be 'a Tartarus as well as an Elysium; a place provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just', reflecting men's desire that wrong-doers who get away with their crimes be punished even after they are dead and can no longer obstruct society's pursuit of utility (II.ii.3.12).
Yet Smith's central criticism of Hume's theory of justice as an artificial virtue was that it neglected the inbuilt pre-conventional checks to rapacious behaviour that were located in human moral capacities, and that made men aware of the virtue of justice long before the establishment of self-interested conventions, and indeed made such later conventions possible at all. Hume's flagship case of justice could not properly be considered as artificial all the way down.
This generated at least two consequences. First, Smith's corrective indicated that if Hume's wider commercial sociability framework was to pass muster at the level of technical detail, then the natural/artificial heuristic would have to be abandoned when attempting to correctly explain the origin of justice, and hence of large and lasting society. Second, and in part as a consequence, Smith should be read as fundamentally problematizing the coherence of any natural/artificial bifurcation tout court. Not only were there no 'natural' virtues in the state of nature, but justice, the paradigm case of an 'artificial' virtue, turned out to be explicable only through appeals to non-conventional features located in natural human affections (especially resentment and the desire to punish). In other words, explaining the foundations of morality required a level of integrated complexity that went beyond Hume's division of natural and artificial. But given that the natural/artificial distinction was central to Hume's account of the foundations of morals, the corresponding implication was that Hume's theory was not
able to achieve what was ultimately required. understood as 'a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility' (Hume 1998, A3.5; SBN 306) . He likely dropped the terminology of 'natural' and 'artificial', however, because despite attempts to forestall misunderstanding this had led his readers into confusion, as his famous letter to Francis Hutcheson illustrates. 10 In any case, Hume's settled position, clearly stated in the Enquiry as in the Treatise, is that whatever their particular genesis, all virtue could at root be defined as that 'which is useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others', with vice the reverse (Hume 1998, 9 .12; SBN 277; cf. 9.1; SBN 268).
Utility and the Second Enquiry
Where the Enquiry perhaps does differ is with regard to the emphasis Hume puts on utility as the source of moral approbation. In addition to an entire section entitled 'Why Utility Pleases', Hume states that utility is 'the sole origin of justice' and the sole foundation for our moral approval for that virtue (3.1; SBN 183); that public utility is the primary reason we believe there to be 'a natural beauty and amiableness' even amidst 'uninstructed mankind' with regard to the social virtues (5.4; SBN 214-5); and that the extent to which we find things agreeable to ourselves is in fact rather limited, and we are more frequently interested in what is useful (Section 7, passim). In the Enquiry Hume stresses that the bulk of our moral judgements are generated by a sense not of the agreeable, but of the useful, where our capacity for sympathy ties us together through an ability to take pleasure in the attainment of utility not just for ourselves, but our peers.
We should perhaps be wary of overstating the differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry on this matter. 11 Nonetheless, if we grant that in the later work Hume committed himself more fully to an endorsement of utility as the main foundation of moral approbation, we can see Part IV of TMS, 'Of the Effect of Utility on the Sentiment of Approbation', not only as a corresponding rejection of Hume's specific 10 See especially Hume 2007, T.3.2.2.19; SBN 484 and T.3.2.6.11; SBN 533-4 , which make clear that the distinction between artificial and natural virtues is a heuristic device, without independent normative import. In a letter replying to an original correspondence that is now lost, Hume wrote Hutcheson 'I have never called justice unnatural, but only artificial' -indicating that Hutcheson rather refused to take the point (Hume 1932b, 33) . 11 Hume, after all, is clear in the Treatise that it is utility, rather than agreeableness, which 'determine all the great lines of our duty ' (T.3.3.1.27; .
arguments (as is already well recognised), but, when coupled with Smith's earlier rejection of the distinction between artificial and natural virtues, as an attempt at the rejection of Hume's earlier theory so as to make room for Smith's rival account.
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Part IV of TMS is a direct reply to Hume, that 'ingenuous and agreeable philosopher' who has 'of late' attempted to explain 'why utility pleases' (Smith 1976, IV.1.2) . Chapter 1 sees Smith begin by taking issue with Hume's claim that we desire external objects for the actual utility that they bring, in turn offering his own alternative theory in its place. Smith argued that a quirk of human psychology causes us to be excessively dazzled and preoccupied with the means of promoting utility, rather than with utility itself. Furthermore, what we sympathize with in others is not the actual utility derived from their goods and circumstances, but the pleasure we imagine that others should feel given that they are equipped with extensive and well-contrived means of pleasure-promotion. We admire the rich and powerful not because, as Hume had claimed, we sympathize (in the 'ideas' into 'impressions' sense) with their actual pleasures, but because we take pleasure in the correspondence of sentiments with what we imagine they ought to feel when entering imaginatively into their situation (compare Hume 2007, T.2.2.5.13-14; SBN.362 with Smith 1976, IV.1.3-9) . This explained why, despite the fact that the rich and famous are typically not in fact made happy by their riches and fame, most people nonetheless esteem and emulate their social and economic superiors. (It also leads to the strange irony that 'the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possess the security which kings are fighting for' (Smith 1976, IV.1.10) ).
Yet according to Smith it is 'well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind'. Esteem and emulation arising from the imagination of pleasure that could be attained (and not from the actual securing of utility) was the great spur to human industry. It was what prompted men to leave the indolence of their primitive conditions, and eventually to 'found cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, which ennoble and embellish human life' (IV.1.10). Human civilization was founded upon not just unintended consequences (Otteson 2002, 121-2) , but a quirk of human psychology that the cold reason of sober philosophy struggled to endorse, and yet which constituted the lynchpin of collective human material progress.
Smith's diagnosis of the neuroses of economic consumption was highly original, and indeed he himself claimed that the phenomenon he identified 'has not, as far as I know, been yet taken notice of by any body' (Smith 1976, IV.I.3) . It certainly went beyond anything found in Hume, and meant that Smith's attitude towards economic consumption, and its ties to moral psychology and in turn the capacity for, and manifestation of, virtue, also played out differently (Diatkine 2010; Sagar forthcoming).
In particular, Smith went on to be more preoccupied and troubled than Hume had been by the dynamics of, and possibilities for, moral corruption in commercial society.
Whereas both thinkers analysed it, Smith went much further in critiquing it. In particular,
Smith worried more than Hume about the tendency for sympathy to make us unduly deferential and submissive to the whims of the rich and powerful, in turn helping to generate the socially corrosive contagion of vanity, and not just the more benign effects of deference to authority (Smith 1976, I.iii.2.III; cf. Hanley 2008 , but also Sagar forthcoming).
Having set out his own stall in Chapter 2 of Part IV, Smith trained his sights on
Hume's specific arguments, presenting his own account of propriety and merit as better equipped to explain approbation or disapprobation than Hume's arguments from utility (Smith 1976, IV.2.4-11 But if men really were solitary (this again being a heuristic device, not a literal claim about how men might ever have been), they would in fact not form the ideas of vice and virtue, even though they might have the idea of utility:
As these perceptions, however, are merely a matter of taste, and have all the feebleness and delicacy of that species of perceptions, upon the justness of which what is properly called taste is founded, they probably would not be much attended to by one in this solitary and miserable condition. Even though they should occur to him, they would be no means have the same effect upon him, antecedent to his connexion with society, which they would have in consequence of that connexion…All such sentiments suppose the idea of some other being, who is the natural judge of the person that feels them; and it is only by sympathy with the decisions of this arbiter of his conduct, that he can conceive, either the triumph of self-applause, or the shame of self-condemnation (IV.2.12).
In other words, utility could only have the effects Hume wished to claim for it if something like Smith's account of the virtues was already in place. But if that account was in place, Hume's explanation of utility as the dominant feature in our moral judgements was redundant. What did the work was imagining our self into the situations of others and comparing sentiments, with approbation and disapprobation arising accordingly.
It might be thought with Raynor (1984, 59-60) is that Hume's theory must be abandoned in favour of the one they are simultaneously being presented with. Smith thus sought to reject, and then replace, Hume's arguments, whilst operating on the same theoretical ground, and with the same basic materials, that the older philosopher had first put forward.
Conclusion
Why did Smith leave these results to be inferred, rather than stating them directly? We will never know for sure, but at least three likely explanations are available, which also
give us reason to think that the above reading is not impugned by the fact that Smith never explicitly affirms it. The first is that Smith did not wish to draw too much attention to his engagement with -and by turns, potential proximity too -Hume's ideas, given the latter's unwelcome status in Scottish intellectual circles, the misunderstandings that tended to attach to Hume's arguments, and Smith's desire to retain a professional university post of the sort conspicuously denied to Hume. have wanted to draw attention away from criticism of other thinkers he thought more misguided than Hume, and that he opposed more directly. Smith didn't think that anybody had adequately theorized our moral sentiments before TMS, and Hume had at least gotten further than the rest, and been using the right materials. Hence, better not to slow the progress of wider learning by focusing too much attention on a mistaken account that had at least helped make Smith's cutting-edge intervention possible, undue focus upon which might distract from Smith's positive interventions which were anyway designed to get beyond the problems Smith had identified in Hume's account.
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If the reading suggested by this paper is correct, there are both philosophical and historical consequences to consider. On the historical side, the most important upshot is and constructed a response that was a serious and profound challenge to its viability.
In philosophical matters, implications are generated for how we respectively place Hume and Smith as pioneers of ethical sentimentalist theories, and what that means in turn. One thing that I have tried to indicate is that the differences between
Hume and Smith are not exhausted at the level of specific disagreements over sympathy, or the nature of justice, or of the role of utility, taken in isolation, but that these together are facets of a more fundamental attempt by Smith to reject Hume's moral theory, in order to replace it with his own. 14 Yet this suggests that conventional assessments of Hume and Smith may mistakenly give pride of place to an inferior, and nearcontemporaneously surpassed, moral theory. It is still Hume, and not Smith, who takes precedent on undergraduate reading lists in ethics and the history of moral philosophy, and who is treated by many contemporary scholars as the greatest historical exponent of sentimentalist ethics, serving as the primary inspiration for more recent attempts to 14 In particular I have left aside the question of whether Hume was right that although Smith's revised conception of sympathy was the 'hinge' of his system, it was nonetheless a false account -the implication perhaps being that Smith's entire system failed in turn (e.g. Raynor 1984) . As it happens, I agree with Fleischacker (2012, 300-3) that Smith has the resources to answer Hume (whose criticisms are misplaced), and that the younger Scot has the better of things with regards the plausibility of his theory of sympathy. This stands against the more prevalent view that Hume has identified a crucial flaw in Smith's apparatus (Raynor 1984, 56-9; Blackburn 1998, 203-4; Broadie 2006, 170-4 
